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Abstract—There is a widely accepted need for methodologies
to verify the security and privacy of services. A typical service
requires user data and then makes them available through the
Internet independently from access platforms or user locations,
but the layman is rarely aware of the entailed risks and seldom
acts cautiously. The combined human-and-technology system is
complex: it intertwines the technical protocols that establish the
technical security and privacy properties, with the social protocols
that regulate human attitudes to and behaviour with computers. A
number of security and privacy threats are therefore inherently
socio-technical. An appropriate methodology to tackle security
and privacy of web services from a socio-technical standpoint,
namely when the human is in the loop, is still missing. This
paper introduces one, termed the ceremony concertina traversal
methodology. It advocates that technology is analysed in the
presence of the human through the various structural layers that
arise, from computer processes to user personas. Layers should be
analysed individually then in combination, so as to transmit the
guarantees that the technology is sound to its users in practical
scenarios.
Keywords—security ceremony; concertina; cloud; cybersecurity;
modelling; veriﬁcation; awareness;
I. INTRODUCTION
The availability of web services is changing the way
humans rely on data and computing resources in general.
Cloud infrastructures have given additional momentum to the
use of services; for example, a researcher claims: “I am a
cloudy researcher: I do not need an hard drive any more: I
keep my documents on Dropbox and spideroak, my code on
assembla, sourceforge, google code, github, literature papers
on zotero and cloudme, my bookmarks on xmarks, my mail on
several imap servers” [1]. This calls for research in Computer
Science to ensure security and privacy of service computing,
namely that the technology works as intended by its designers.
An additional hierarchy of threats comes from the users, who
may have a varying degree of familiarity with the technology,
and fail or refuse to use it as intended by its designers.
A number of examples can be drawn from the real world.
Even if password-based authentication works in purely tech-
nical terms, it will not work in practice if passwords are
are chosen following predictable patterns or are written on
sticky notes afﬁxed on monitors for passersby to see. Users
may do fuzzy matching and accept a spoof web site, say
http://www.europe.eu, as the real one, http://www.europa.eu.
They may succumb to click-whirr responses [2], namely per-
form a routine series of steps absent-mindedly in an insecure
setting, such as on a public hotspot, simply because they used
to perform them every day on their institutional LAN.
This suggests that an extended view of a security proto-
col is needed to include human users, social protocols and
behaviours: that is, see the system as a much more complex
socio-technical system. This extension of a security protocol
is termed a security ceremony [3]. It is widely accepted within
security circles that “security is a chain, and people are the
weakest link in the chain” [4]; by contrast, our long-term
goal is to establish security and privacy in the presence of
the human. This calls for a socio-technical approach that
may ultimately require a transdisciplinary combined effort by
computer scientists with social scientists, psychologists, etc.
We argue that this is the main security and privacy challenge
of the current decade.
An example of a transdisciplinary contribution comes from
Bella and Coles-Kemp, who recently provided a model in
support of the socio-technical analysis of security and privacy
termed the ceremony concertina [5]. The concertina links
technology to society through a number of layers, which
represent the interposing stakeholders, ranging from computer
processes to user personas. The present paper adopts that
model and easily tailors it to service computing. The main
contribution of this paper is the use of that concertina to
deﬁne a socio-technical methodology for analysing security
and privacy in the world of service computing. Termed the
ceremony concertina traversal methodology, it partitions the
problem of socio-technical security and privacy into smaller
sub-problems. These are the analysis of each layer individually
and then their analysis in combination. The methodology also
offers the researcher the freedom to concentrate on certain
layers rather than others, or on all layers at the same time.
Our methodology purposely does not prescribe speciﬁc
research methods; rather, depending on the researcher’s fo-
cus, the most appropriate research methods are left as their
choice, to make among formal methods, analytical methods
and empirical ones. The ceremony concertina model offers
anyone from virtually any discipline, who wants to investi-
gate socio-technical aspects of security and privacy, a canvas
on which to paint their ﬁndings. Our ceremony concertina
traversal methodology offers practical directions on where and
how to paint on that canvas, namely obtain ﬁndings. The
practical value is to enable the researcher to take the guarantees
of security and privacy that the technology establishes and
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transmit them reliably and effectively to its users. For example,
Bella et al have recently adopted it successfully to analyse the
TLS certiﬁcate validation ceremony [6], and Huynen et al to
identify critical decision points in the ceremonies that users
follow to access WiFi networks via Hotspots [7]. After the
related work (§II), the present paper gives the full details of
the methodology (§III), and concludes (§IV).
II. RELATED WORK
Security experts can no longer ignore the humans in the
security chain given the evidence that, in attacking infor-
mation systems, social engineering may be more effective
than hacking the system’s technical defences [8]. Sometimes
technical ﬂaws may provide the basis for launching a social
engineering attack. For example, in context-aware phishing [9],
the hacker uses a ﬂaw in the victim’s browser to obtain
personal information about the victim’s bidding history or
shopping preferences. This stolen information lets the attacker
customize its scamming messages to gain the victim’s trust.
It has only recently become fully understood by security
researchers that very many socio-technical attacks are possible
because security mechanisms are not designed to be used
by the users. This sounds paradoxical from a socio-oriented
perspective, but it has roots in the usual practice of reproaching
users who commit security naiveties after ignoring security
advice. This practice is, indeed, being proved wrong: many
users consider current security mechanisms unhelpful, if not
completely annoying [10], to their daily work. This is the
ultimate reason why people often bypass even the strongest
security mechanism, and often in surprisingly ingenious ways
[11]: the suggested “secure” behaviour is not sustainable
from the usability-centred and psychology-centred point of
view (economy) of users. Therefore, far from being irrational,
users commonly follow a rational economic strategy, which
the traditional technically-oriented approach to security often
ignores. The claim that humans are always the weakest link
in the security chain also requires understanding what makes
the system (humans included) insecure, and applying this
knowledge to secure system design can be effective [12].
The socio-technical aspects of information security have
captured the interest of computer scientists only recently. Very
little has been done to study, mathematically and systemati-
cally, the nature of the socio-technical deﬁciencies of on-line
systems and protocols, of socio-technical attacks, and of the
possible defenses. Only a few approaches have been proposed
to develop a formal background for the analysis of human
factors [13] and fewer still applying this to security [14].
Few approaches include humans in the design of systems to
improve their security [12]. Socio-technical security relates
also to the understanding of the psychology of security [15]
and of deception [16]. Stajano and Wilson published a useful
study about how people fall victim to scams and frauds [17].
They observed that the victims’ behaviour followed precise
patterns, and identiﬁed a list of seven principles, each ex-
pressing a mechanism exploited by the hustlers in performing
their deceptions. The study of human behavioural patterns
makes it possible to understand the failure modes of the user
“component” [18]. We share this viewpoint.
Conducting security analysis motivated Ellison in propos-
ing security ceremonies [3]. According to him, the term “cere-
mony” was ﬁrst coined by Jesse Walker to indicate those com-
munications between human nodes and other nodes that hap-
pen usually not via network connections, but instead through
user interfaces, face-to-face interactions, peripheral devices, or
transfers of physical objects that carry data (for example USB
memory sticks). Examples of ceremonies include password
authentication and registration procedures, or the protocol that
users follow interacting with an ATM machine. Thinking of
protocols as ceremonies brings new insights in understanding
how security does or does not work, and reveals ﬂaws that
a sheer reductionist approach to technical security is not able
to capture. This is clearly shown in recent work of Radke et
al [19]. The authors identify ﬂaws in the Mini Opera browser
ceremonies emerging from the HTTPS protocol when used in a
certain context, despite the fact that the protocol is correct and
secure in the traditional meaning of those terms. Their result
shows that the practice of security protocol analysis must be
bound to the ceremonial context in which a protocol runs:
“even when considering the same protocol, a different context
is a different ceremony”. This is a complementary perspective
from that of provable security which, instead, aims to ensure
that a protocol is secure regardless of how it is used. Similarly,
Radke et al comment on the security of a ceremony that
involves the TLS protocol [20]. Karlof et al proposed design
principles for obtaining conditioned-safe ceremonies [2]. A
conditioned-safe ceremony is one that conditions users to
take safe decisions even in the presence of social engineering
attacks. They evaluated their principles by conducting a study
of over two hundreds participants, who were observed while
using different email registration/authentication ceremonies
that where occasionally attacked by an adversary. Martina and
Carlos comment on formal approaches that can potentially be
applied to analyse security ceremonies [21].
III. A SOCIO-TECHNICAL METHODOLOGY
Our methodology stems from an original approach (III-A),
based upon a recent model (III-B), to the security and privacy
analysis of services. In targeting both social and technical as-
pects, the methodology is socio-technical, as its steps indicate
(III-C). Example uses of the methodology follow (III-D).
A. Approach
Our methodology insists on a multi-layer though integrated
approach to the analysis of the security of services. To the
best of our knowledge, it is the ﬁrst time that the analysis
of services is advocated to happen in a multi-layer and
integrated way. It is the multi-layer approach what makes the
analysis socio-technical. The analysis is targeted at complex
socio-technical properties centred on the human [6], rather
than merely technical ones such as key conﬁdentiality in
the traditional sense of security protocol analysis [22]. As
it shall be seen below, it is the integrated approach what
makes the analysis of practical value for real-world mass use.
The ﬁndings at the various layers are combined to provide
assurances or pinpoint weaknesses to the actual human users
of the services.
It is worth remarking that our methodology is not con-
cerned with software veriﬁcation. Rather, it is designed to
support the upcoming formal analysis of abstract speciﬁcations
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Fig. 1. The model of the full security ceremony [5] underlying our research methodology
of protocols with their surrounding use contexts, rather than
of actual programming code.
B. Model
As mentioned above, a security ceremony expands a secu-
rity protocol with the out-of-band, notably with the user [3].
Our research leverages upon the recent model of security
ceremonies of Bella and Coles-Kemp [5], in Figure 1.
The model identiﬁes several layers, which go beyond the
original ceremonies between users and systems as described
by Ellison [3]. This ceremony model is capable of capturing
additional elements of the interaction between users and tech-
nology. This aim is also supported by Whitworth [23], who
argues for the importance of the interfaces between humans
and machines, but also acknowledges the outermost layer
whereby society inﬂuences behaviour by means such as word
of mouth, media publicity and the users’ engagement with
technology [24]. Therefore, our methodology is oriented to
see the workbench for a socio-technical security analysis as a
ﬁner-grained picture, termed the full security ceremony.
The layers in Figure 1 feature various abstractions of two
example users Alice and Bob, additionally expanded with
Society — such abstractions are termed players. From left
to right, the small, yellow boxes indicate the players. They
are, respectively, the computer process pB running a security
protocol with Alice on Bob’s behalf and the computer process
pA running the security protocol with Bob on Alice’s behalf.
Then comes the user interface UIA for her, a generic persona
PA of hers, and ﬁnally Alice as a human, that is, herself HA.
The layers can be understood as follows.
Layer I, Informational, concerns the security protocol run-
ning between computer processes in order to secure Alice and
Bob’s exchange over a potentially insecure network.
Layer II, Operating System, manages the inter-process
communication between the process that executes the security
protocol on behalf of a user and the process that runs the
interface presented to that user.
Layer III, Human-Computer Interaction, indicates the
socio-technical protocol whereby a user interacts with a graph-
ical user interface, such as by ﬁlling in forms. This is clearly a
technical protocol because of the interaction with the technol-
ogy, but is deeply intertwined with the social protocols [25]
regulating the individuals’ expressions of social capabilities
such as trust, recommendations and advice. The user is not
involved directly but instead through one of their personas
expressed through the outermore layer.
Layer IV, Personal, pertains to the user expression of a
persona in order to engage with speciﬁc technology. Persona
is used to refer to a particular, abstracted view of a class of
common user behaviour. A user may express various personas.
For example, when accessing on-line bank services to pay
for bills, users may well express different personas to when
accessing their Facebook accounts to catch up with friends.
They may be less willing to download new applications when
in the middle of bank transactions, for example, than when
attempting to share contents with friends. Computer scientists
typically tend to assume the most careless persona, hence
to develop a technology that compels every possible user
to a secure interaction; by contrast, social scientists often
ﬁnd this approach limitative and inappropriate to ensure user
engagement and satisfaction, hence recommend consideration
for a variety of personas.
Layer V, Communal, reﬂects the reciprocal inﬂuence of
society, including other players, over individuals engaging
in a security ceremony. For example, a national campaign
could inﬂuence users towards being more careful in opening
attachments from unknown sources. Someone working in a
team might be inﬂuenced by the norms of that team.
Additional considerations on the full security ceremony
now become intuitive. One is that adjacent layers share a
player, who plays in both. Also, each layer features what is
termed an interaction between a pair of players, such as the
socio-technical protocol or the security protocol. Players only
interact within a layer. Interacting players may not belong to
the same user, as is the case of layer I.
Our research demonstrates that the full security ceremony
model can be modiﬁed to reﬂect human interaction with web
services. We contribute this modiﬁed model by means of
two modiﬁcations: one is to replace the network with an
infrastructure in general as the means of communications,
which could then be instantiated with the Internet or the cloud
depending on the application scenario; the other is to collapse
one of the two sides, say B’s, as a service. General pictures
are omitted here due to space limitations, but the following
example uses of the methodology (§III-D) feature some.
C. Steps
Our methodology could be termed the ceremony concertina
traversal methodology, as it proceeds from the interpretation
of the layers in the full security ceremony as a concertina.
Therefore, the full security ceremony can be compressed or
expanded conveniently, depending on the researcher’s target:
the ceremony layers of interest.
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We are not aware of existing research methodologies aimed
at bringing technical guarantees on security and privacy of
services up to the level of humans in a systematic way, and
this may be due to the relative scarcity of joint research
by computer scientists with social scientists. Our ceremony
concertina traversal methodology consists of two main steps.
Step 1. Traverse the target ceremony layers in isolation by
means of semi-formal analysis. Here, traversing a layer means
to analyse an interaction between a pair of players, but may
also require analysing each player. The methodology does not
compel us to traverse all layers of the full security ceremony
extensively. By contrast, the methodology allows layers to be
concertina-ed together, retaining the full ceremony in outline
but abstracting away from the details of particular layers. For
example, if one does not need or want to analyse how society
shapes the human engagement with technology and how this
engagement gets reﬂected back over society, then they will not
traverse layer V. In consequence, layer V could be collapsed.
Depending on the researcher’s expertise and interest, a variety
of example traversals can be envisaged, such as of both layers
I and III while collapsing the others, or of part of layer IV
— of course, an analysis that is conﬁned within layers I and
II would be purely technical. Then, depending on the layer
to traverse, the researcher will select the most appropriate
research methods and corresponding tools, such as analytical
and empirical ones for layer IV, and formal ones for layer II.
Step 2. Traverse the target ceremony layers in combination
by means of semi-formal analysis, aiming at building the target
traversal, that is one between human personas and technology.
Part of the combination is achieved by analysing the layers
in synergy, that is by using the insights deriving from the
analysis of a layer to orient the analysis of adjacent layers. This
makes it possible to address stringent though yet unanswered
questions as to whether there exist realistic (in the sense
of widespread in our world) personas to comply with given
secure technology or, dually, whether secure technology can
be designed to comply with given realistic personas. Another
aspect of the combination is achieved by attempting to reuse
over a layer the formal techniques typically adopted over
other layers, expecting fresh insights. For example, security
and socio-technical protocols have many similarities though
they concern different levels of abstraction, hence the reuse
of typical interaction design techniques over security protocol
analysis and vice versa appears promising.
An additional strength of our methodology is that the target
traversal between human personas and technology could be
built by composing shorter traversals, such as layer traversals,
in many ways, and each time with potential for novel insights.
For example, traversing from right to left involves starting
with a security protocol analysis. Once the security protocol
properties are established, they can drive the user interface
analysis and the socio-technical protocol analysis to ultimately
assess whether the technical properties can be successfully
transmitted to realistic personas as human-perceivable senses
of security. For example, if the security protocol were SSL,
then the researcher should be able to deﬁne a real-world
persona to whom the user interface and then the socio-technical
protocol together manage to transmit senses of authentication
and conﬁdentiality. This persona could then be assessed for its
plausibility by empirical methods.
The target ceremony traversal could also be built from left
to right. A social scientist could start with layer V or, possibly
with the collaboration of a computer scientist, with the analysis
of the socio-technical protocol of layer III to assess the senses
of security it delivers to what persona. This direction ultimately
guides the security protocol analysis towards properties that
can support those senses of security. Potential modiﬁcations
to the security protocol arising from this direction would be in
the desirable spirit of human-compliant technology. A simple
existing example occurs with respect to cash machines: people
using cash machines tended to walk away with their cash
forgetting their debit card (this is an example of a general
phenomenon known as a post-completion error). This issue
was overcome by adjusting the technology to dispense cash
only after returning the card. Incidentally, Curzon’s user model
based analysis is one way to detect post-completion [26].
D. Example Uses
This section details three example uses of our ceremony
concertina traversal methodology that the researcher could
realistically make. These respectively focus on layers I and III,
then on aspects of layers IV, and ﬁnally on parts of layer II.
As observed above, each layer demands speciﬁc expertise, with
the lower layers more naturally targeted by computer scientists,
the higher layers by social scientists, and layer III inherently
demanding their transdisciplinary work.
Example 1. The formal analysis of the two-layered security
ceremony consisting of layers I and III for services. This
ceremony is depicted in Figure 2, which is derived from Figure
1 by collapsing certain layers and instantiating it over the
infrastructure as discussed (III-B). Precisely, because layer
II is collapsed, the user interface for Alice and the process
executing the security protocol for her coincide, indicated as
UIA; because Alice is interacting with a web service, this
is monolithically indicated as pB . The focus of the analysis is
shaded, indicating its three parts: layer I (dashed border), layer
II (dot-dashed border) and the user interface (dotted border).
Each of these offers research challenges in their own right: the
analyses of security protocols, of socio-technical protocols, of
user interfaces and the interaction design all these embody.
pBPA
security
protocol
socio-tech
protocol
infrastructurecomputer
I. InformationalIII. H.C.I.
UIA
human
Fig. 2. The two-layered security ceremony instantiated over the infrastructure:
focus of example use 1 of our ceremony concertina traversal methodology is
shaded
In particular, analysing security protocols in support of
services involves dealing with tricky properties such as the var-
ious versions of privacy. For example, users may not entirely
trust the service provider and may thus require unlinkability
with their identity of some of the data that they transmit.
Then, analysing human-computer interaction with the service,
namely socio-technical protocols, entails the range of issues
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related to human beliefs and misconceptions about services
outlined above (II). Finally, user interfaces with services are
far from trivial to design well, not least in the need to balance
usability and customisability. For example, it may not be
immediately visible to users that a popular application for
File Hosting such as Dropbox allows the user to decide which
shared folder to synchronise with their local device, and which
to leave only with the service.
The combined analysis of the system consisting of all
shaded areas in Figure 2 appears to be more challenging. The
ceremony traversal can be carried out in both directions ac-
cording to what we described above (§III-C). In consequence,
the ﬁndings of security protocol analysis will inspire socio-
technical protocol analysis and vice versa.
Example 2. The experimental analysis of part of layer IV
of the security ceremony for services. The target layer for
this example use of our methodology, as depicted in Figure
3, is layer IV. Here, the focus is on how a human being,
subject to a huge spectrum of stimuli coming from society,
expresses a speciﬁc persona in facing certain technology at
some point in time. Here, the interaction “expression” is drawn
smaller than in Figure 1 to indicate that only a part of the
interaction, as deﬁned below, is targeted in this example use
of the methodology.
PAHA expression
human
IV. Personal
Fig. 3. Part of layer IV of the security ceremony: focus of example use 2
of our ceremony concertina traversal methodology is shaded
In this example, the part of the interaction that is tackled
concerns the characterisation of the personas that a human can
express for what concerns security and privacy when using a
service. The analytical and empirical analysis of this part also
reveals whether the speciﬁc personas utilised in layer III in
the previous example are realistic, that is whether they are
statistically signiﬁcant. Such analysis consists of conducting
experiments to monitor how users generally behave when fac-
ing speciﬁc tasks on services, or guided surveys to denote how
they would abstractly design the interface with the technology
if they could [27]. Of course, these experiments require the
availability of reasonably large sample populations to submit
questionnaires to. This example use of our methodology is
fundamental because it contributes to grounding other ﬁndings
to the real world.
Example 3, the formal analysis of part of layer II of the
security ceremony for services. This example use tackles layer
II. Hence, the security ceremony featuring layer II only, where
all other layers have been collapsed, is visualised in Figure
4. Similarly to the previous example, the interaction “process
management” is drawn smaller than in Figure 1 to indicate
that only a part is analysed.
Because Operating System analysis already is a large and
pAUIA
process
management
computer
II. O.S.
Fig. 4. Part of layer II of the security ceremony: focus of example use 3 of
our ceremony concertina traversal methodology is shaded
well-established research area (with more than 39 million
Google entries at time of this writing), a variety of research
methods can be appealed to. In particular, the part of the
interaction that this example use tackles concerns the speciﬁc
inter-process communication between the process pA running
the security protocol and the user interface process UIA aimed
at signaling to the user the security properties established by
the protocol. For example, at some point the protocol process
should send the interface process data signifying that end-
to-end security has been established, which means that the
interface process can display an appropriate visual signal —
often a padlock or a green address bar — and that data clearly
is security sensitive. Similarly, the data that the user enters in
the interface often are privacy sensitive.
This interaction is very much worth the analysis effort
for various reasons. One is that there exist no standards as
to how an interface should treat security guarantees coming
from the security protocol, and how they should be conveyed
to users. The issue is with the very data that the protocol
process should send to the interface process, which are to
be interpreted with speciﬁc visual or acoustic signals aimed
at transmitting the very sense of security corresponding to
the data. Such data in practice is not speciﬁc, and far from
being standardised. In consequence, how the interface is to be
notiﬁed, for example, that the security protocol authenticated
the remote peer remains protocol-dependent. Moreover, also
the cues that the user interface should use have not been
codiﬁed, and are far from being standardised. Notably, a recent
release of the Opera Mini browser, with its 144 million users
each month worldwide [28], was found to display a padlock
when an intermediate server interposes between the client and
the server, hence without end-to-end security [19].
Another reason is that various interfaces could be used to
access services while favouring the user feeling of locality,
that the application is running locally rather than remotely.
This aim has inspired various forms of desktop integration
for services, such as dedicated icons or integration with pre-
existing programs with which the user is likely to be already
familiar. A representative example of the latter is the seamless
integration of applications, such as the version control system
Tortoise [29] and the File Hosting application Dropbox [30],
with the standard program to explore the local ﬁle system.
This example use of our methodology has ambitious aims.
Inter-process communication does not seem to have been
analysed so far at the level of abstraction advocated here. It is
expected that this layer can be ultimately speciﬁed in terms of
exchanges between two parties, and that the methods used to
analyse layer I could be tailored to the new layer. Ambition
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does not derive only from sheer complexity, but also from the
expected resistance that could be encountered in suggesting
conventional associations, that is, standards: between security
properties and process data for inter-process communication on
one hand, and consequently between process data and visual
or acoustic signals. With standards in place, the future analyses
would gain clear-cut objectives.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Service computing is tightly intertwined with human inter-
action. The security and privacy problem then acquires more
facets than the typical technical problem has. It cannot con-
clude with evidence that the technology works as intended by
its designers because that technology is meant to be practically
used by humans. They may have varying degrees of familiarity
with computers, so fail or refuse to use it as intended by its
designers. Hence, security and privacy should be considered a
socio-technical problem and treated accordingly.
This paper described a methodology for the socio-technical
analysis of security and privacy of web services. The ceremony
concertina traversal methodology prescribes the various layers
that combine the technology with the human to be analysed
systematically. This encompasses research on security and pri-
vacy of various areas, identiﬁed by the layers of the underlying
model, such as networks and service infrastructures, Operating
Systems, user interface design, personas that users express in
front of the technology, societal inﬂuence, etc.
Our methodology implicitly demands the deﬁnition of
appropriate threat models and realistic requirements for the
systems, as well as a variety of skills and research methods
for researchers. For example, computer scientists could intro-
duce formal methods, which bring the rigour of mathematical
reasoning, social scientists could introduce empirical methods,
which ground all arguments upon real users, and psychologists
could introduce analytical methods, which insist on structure
and schematisation. This transdisciplinary combination of ef-
forts towards the practical enforcement of security and privacy
seems the biggest challenge ahead.
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